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Abstract 
As the private sector and government begin to spend billions of dollars to research and deploy carbon capture and storage (CCS)
technology, the question of legal liability for managing short-term and long-term environmental, health and safety risks must be
addressed.  We examine potential CCS liability within a U.S. context and survey the existing environmental and tort law liability
regimes that may affect CCS.  We conclude that while existing liability regimes are insufficient on their own to govern the CCS
industry, they could provide important risk management tools and serve as safeguards to private parties and governments in the 
event of harm.  We also propose a model for long term stewardship, blending including bonding, insurance, and pooled federal 
funding into commercial CCS project management to better provide financial security to investors without destroying existing 
liability protections for those who may suffer harm from CCS. This proposal offers a starting point to develop a model to 
integrate liability for the nascent CCS industry. A longer version of this paper can be found in the Emory Law Review, Fall 2008. 
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1. Introduction 
Creating a liability regime for CCS must balance the risks and benefits of the technology and will likely influence 
patterns of CCS deployment. The clarity, certainty and extent of legal liability can heavily affect technology 
adoption, particularly new technology deployment. Companies considering adopting new technology are adverse to 
unknown or potentially unlimited liability associated with technological problems new to commercial scale 
deployment. Stable and certain liability terms help guide company investment as well as shareholder and financial 
community expectations. Legal liability is also important for government actors wishing to promote a technology 
because it helps ensure the party with the most information about risks and solutions takes appropriate measures to 
avoid problematic consequences. And finally, clear and transparent liability regimes help the public understand and 
have confidence that risks – to human health and their surrounding environment – will be actively managed and, in 
the event of an accident, effectively remediated and compensated. There are potentially several different kinds of 
liability associated with CCS projects—here we focus on liability arising from environmental health and safety 
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(EH&S) considerations. We recognize that liability linked with CCS and any future climate regime is important, but 
leave a more in-depth discussion for future work. 
EH&S liability is linked to risk and driven by the behaviour of CO2 in the subsurface: of key import are (1) the 
volume of CO2 to be injected—millions of tons per project; (2) initial buoyancy of injected CO2; and (3) the need for 
injected CO2 to remain in the subsurface for hundreds to thousands of years.  The risks from CCS are associated 
both with the sheer volume of injected material, as well as the specific properties of CO2 and where the CO2 will be 
injected [1].  CCS risks will vary through the lifecycle of a CCS project and are affected by local and regional 
geology, site history, and will likely decrease after injection ceases as formation buoyancy pressures naturally 
decrease [2, 3]. 
While experts predict that the injected CO2 is very likely to remain underground, initially, buoyancy flow could 
drive CO2 upward through undetected faults or abandoned well bores, making site selection and characterization 
particularly important for a successful project.  Slow CO2 seepage into the near subsurface could also harm flora and 
fauna, and potentially cause local disruptions of ecology or agriculture [4].  Over time persistent leakage could also 
have compromise CCS’s climate efficacy. There are also a number of risks associated with injected CO2 even if it 
remains underground, including displacement of brines into potable aquifers, contamination of hydrocarbon 
resources, pressure changes causing ground heave, and even triggering seismic events—though these risks likely 
will be small with properly-managed sites [5].  
Much of the writing on this topic to date, however, has either implicitly or explicitly argued that policymakers 
should limit or virtually eliminate project operators’ liability associated with stored CO2 in order to encourage 
development of this potential technology [6, 7].  Although we recognize that special mechanisms may needed to 
shield the first dozen CCS projects, we believe liability under federal and state environmental and tort laws can also 
play an important role in ensuring optimal site selection, increasing overall public acceptance of the technology, and 
in helping fill in gaps in any future, comprehensive framework to govern the mature CCS industry.  Although the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) recently proposed rules for injection and geologic storage are 
important, the rules are—by necessity of statutory authority—focused on protecting underground sources of 
drinking water and unable to address liability or many of the risks mentioned above.  Here we present an overview 
of major U.S. environmental and tort considerations and explore what the implications are for future CCS projects. 
We recognize existing statutory and common law not specific to CCS as sub-optimal tools for assigning fault or 
rapidly compensating parties damaged by CCS projects, we believe they could be viewed as a secondary backstop 
behind a future comprehensive federal framework for CCS.  With this in mind, we explore the use of several federal 
liability management mechanisms (bonding, insurance, or pooled funds) that could ensure injured parties are 
compensated for damages and simultaneously create operator incentives for good CCS site selection and 
management.  We present a proposal for an adaptive management framework at the federal level that would 
integrate site-specific performance data into risk pricing and management of project liability. 
2. Existing Federal and State Environmental Liability Framework 
CCS will be deployed into an existing framework of laws, regulations and legal precedent which will vary 
significantly across different jurisdictions. Overarching U.S. federal legislation may impact CCS in several different 
ways. Since the 1970s, Congress and state legislatures have enacted far-reaching legislation to reduce or eliminate 
air and water pollution, govern the generation, storage, and disposal of solid and hazardous waste, and create a 
regulatory system to review, classify, and regulate a host of pollutants and hazardous chemicals.  While we do not 
provide a comprehensive discussion of existing environmental laws that may govern CCS [8],  we focus on the two 
statutes that have the most direct application for CO2 storage, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(“RCRA”)2 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”).3  If 
2 42 U.S.C. § 6901-6992k. 
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675. 
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CO2 is classified as a “waste” or “hazardous substance”, these laws may act as important gap-fillers in any federal 
regulatory system governing CCS.   
RCRA was enacted in 1976 to provide, among other things, a comprehensive “cradle-to-grave” regulatory system 
for identifying, listing, and tracking hazardous wastes; setting standards for the generation, handling, storage, and 
disposal of hazardous wastes; and assisting states with the management of solid wastes from active facilities [9]. 
Section 7002 of RCRA authorizes suits by any person to restrain anyone who has contributed or is contributing to 
the past or present handling of any solid or hazardous waste that endanger human health or the environment.4
RCRA’s provisions may provide liability for harm arising from the long-term storage of CO2, if stored CO2 is 
determined to be a solid or a hazardous waste and may also impose stringent handling, storage, and disposal 
requirements on the CCS process.  RCRA defines solid waste as including “any garbage, refuse, sludge from a 
waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, 
including solid, liquid, semisolid or contained gaseous materials, resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and 
agricultural operations, and from community activities.”5  This definition likely includes stored CO2 in connection 
with CCS operations because the CO2 is arguably “discarded material,” is in “gaseous” or “liquid” form, and results 
from industrial or commercial activities.  Hazardous waste is essentially defined as that which exhibits a hazardous 
characteristic (such characteristics includes ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, and toxicity) or is listed by the EPA 
as hazardous [9].6   CO2 is not currently a listed hazardous waste and it seems unlikely that CO2 alone would be 
considered a hazardous waste, although co-injection with other waste stream constituents (e.g. hydrogen sulfide 
(H2S)) could cause it to be defined so.7  It is also possible EPA would exclude stored CO2 from the definition of 
hazardous waste, as it has done with incinerator ash and, more applicably, for wastes produced during the 
exploration, development, and production of crude oil, natural gas, and geothermal energy [9].  Furthermore the 
industry has made some effort to encourage the classification of CO2 as a “commodity,” which would bring it 
outside the scope of RCRA by avoiding a classification as a “waste,” [10].   
CERCLA, also known as “Superfund”8 was enacted in 1980 to create a federal framework to address the problems 
associated with the existence of hazardous substances in the environment [11].  Unlike other environmental laws 
that govern the generation, management, and disposal of hazardous materials and waste, CERCLA provides a cost-
recovery vehicle for the federal government, state and local governments, and private parties to recover costs 
associated with contamination that occurred in the past. Liability under CERCLA is retroactive, joint, and several 
and is imposed on current as well as past owners and operators of “facilities” where there has been a release of a 
hazardous substance, as well as on those who have generated or transported hazardous substances [9].9  It, however, 
only allows recovery by private parties for money spent on the investigation and remediation of a release of 
hazardous substances; it does not allow private parties to recover damages associated with lost profits, diminution in 
value to property, personal injury, lost rents, punitive damages, or other damages associated with contamination of 
property or the environment, although some state superfund statutes do.  
In order for CERCLA to apply to any releases of CO2, the stored CO2 must be considered a “hazardous substance.”  
As mentioned before, CERCLA nor any other federal environmental statute defines CO2 as a hazardous substance, 
although the EPA has stated that if the injected stream contains mercury or other hazardous substances or were to 
react with groundwater to create hazardous substances, it might be subject to CERCLA liability.10 Given CO2 is 
non-toxic at low concentrations and is not a listed waste, CERCLA likely does not apply to current CO2 injection 
activities unless recognized hazardous substances are present.  If CCS is associated with hydrocarbon production, it 
might fall under the CERCLA “petroleum exclusion” which states that petroleum and natural gas are not hazardous 
substances.  Finally, CERCLA typically does not apply to hazardous substances sold as “useful products” (as 
4 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). 
5 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27). 
6 42 U.S.C. § 6904(5) 
7 73 Fed. Reg. 43492, (July 25, 2008) 
8 The term “Superfund” is from the five-year, $1.6 billion Hazardous Substances Response Trust Fund created to finance cleanups at
CERCLA’s inception.  See 28 U.S.C. § 9507 (establishing fund).   
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).  
10 73 Fed. Reg. 43492, 43504 (July 25, 2008). 
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opposed to those for disposal) which would mean that CERCLA might not cover stored CO2 if it was classified as a 
“commodity” rather than a waste [12].  
Table 1: Different common law doctrines that could affect CCS
Description Elements Tests Example/   Precedents Application to CCS
T
re
sp
as
s Property based tort: 
interferance with a 
plaintiff’s possessory 
interest in his personal 
property (land or 
chattels)
The plaintiff must show that the 1) 
defendant acted voluntarily or with 
an intent to commit the act (not 
necessarily the effects of the act), 
2) that the plaintiff did not consent 
to the trespass in any way and 3) 
that harm was suffered by the 
plaintiff.
Oil and gas: where courts had treated 
migration of resource as analagous to 
wild animals or 'fugitive resources', 
meaning it belonged to no one until 
captured. Once efficient use of the 
resource became a priority for public 
policy, the courts began weighing the 
costs and benefits of storage.
Public policy favoring GHG 
reductions may weigh in favor of 
applying liability sparingly although 
the sheer volumes of CO2 to be 
injected might raise caution.
N
eg
lig
en
ce Common law tort: Conduct liable because 
it failed to take the care 
that a reasonable person 
would to protect 
another from 
foreseeable harm
The plaintiff must show the 
defendant 1) had a duty of care, 2) 
breached that duty, 3) the breach 
was the cause (actual and 
proximate) of the plaintiffs harm 
and 4) demonstrate damages.
Every negligence case involves 
a balancing of social costs and 
benefits associated with the 
defendant's conduct.
It may be difficult to establish the 
appropriate standard of care or the 
duty or breach of that duty with a new 
technology and new industry. 
Establishing the causal link between 
the injected CO2 and the harm may 
also be difficult, particularly where 
several parties are simultaneously 
injecting into the same formation. 
N
eg
lig
en
ce
 p
er
 s
e
Common law tort 
where a statute is 
substituted for the 
'reasonable person 
standard' in a 
negligence action.
The plaintiff must show (1) the 
defendant violated a statute, (2) the 
resulting harm or injury was of the 
kind the statute intended to 
prevent, and (3) the plaintiff was of
the class of persons intended to be 
protected by the statute.
The statute must be read by the 
court to have intended to 
prevent the kind of harm from 
happening to the particular 
plaintiff bringing the action.
Since the 1970s, courts have used 
newly enacted state and federal 
environmental statutes and 
regulations to help define the duty in 
an array of environmental 
negligence and negligence per se 
cases.
The body of state and federal statutes 
that could provide the basis for a 
common law, negligence per se action 
is just developing.
Pr
iv
at
e 
N
ui
sa
nc
e
Property based tort: 
interference with a 
plaintiff’s private use 
and enjoyment of his 
land
 To show PRIVATE nuisance, a 
plaintiff must show an intentional 
and unreasonable (but not 
necessarily illegal) or an 
unintentional but reckless or highly 
dangerous action by the defendant 
which intereferes with the use and 
enjoyment of the plaintiffs land. 
Once established, the court 
generally balances the benefits 
fo the alleged nuisance activity 
with the harm caused and other 
equitable factors to determine 
whether the defendant should 
pay damages or be enjoined 
from actions causing the 
nuisance
The doctrines have been used by 
parties to obtain both injunctive and 
monetary relief from air, water, soil 
and noise pollution resulting from an 
array of industrial and commercial 
activities such as landfills, sewage 
treatment plants, oil refineries, 
quarries and the like.
The doctrine of nuisance could apply 
to an operator complying fully with 
regulations and statutes governing 
behavior if they activity never-the-less 
still interferred substantially with a 
plaintiff's use of his land. However, a 
balancing test might find the public 
benefit from mitigating climate 
change outweighs the harm or cost of 
the action.
Pu
bl
ic
 N
ui
sa
nc
e
Property based tort: 
interference with a 
right common to the 
general public
To show PUBLIC nuisance a 
public body must show an 
unreasonable interference with a 
right common to the general 
public, or a private party must 
show he or she suffered unique 
injury by the same that 
differentiates him/her from the rest 
of the general public. Similar to private nuisance
Similar to private nuisance but 
generally brought by public entities 
such as state attorneys general.
Similar to private nuisance but where 
the activity interefered with a right 
common to the public like the right to 
clean air or water.
St
ri
ct
 L
ia
bi
lit
y
Common law tort: 
Imposes liability 
regardless of intent 
where defendant is in 
the best position to bear 
the loss or avoid the 
risk and usually where 
enganging in 
abnormally dangerous 
enterprise.
The plaintiff must show the 
existence of a high degree of risk, 
likelihood the harm will be great, 
the inability to eliminate harm 
through reasonable care, the extent 
to which the activity is not 
common, the inappropriateness of 
resonable care, and the extent to 
which the value of the activity is 
outweighed by the risk.
Unlike other doctrines, under 
strict liability the plaintiff does 
not need to show the defendant 
intended to act or interfere with 
a legally protected interest.
Courts have held defendants strictly 
liable for a broad range of related 
activities including: the release of 
petroleum or oil contaminating 
groundwater; the seeping of salt 
water contaminating a water supply; 
the release of pollutants during oil 
drilling; and the percolation of 
pollution from oil wells.
States vary considerably in the 
application of strict liability for 
different activities. Similarly the level 
of associated risk varies greatly 
between the geology of different 
potential formations across the 
country.
Table 1.    Different Common Law Doctrines that could affect CCS
In many ways, in comparison to federal environmental statutes, state law, and particularly state common law, has 
the potential to provide non-federal actors more comprehensive relief from harm related to the long-term storage of 
CO2, but also is at risk of preemption by any forthcoming federal regulatory framework on CCS.   Unlike the federal 
environmental statutes, which either do not give states or private parties the right to seek monetary recovery or, in 
the case of CERCLA, allow only for recovery of response costs, the state common law claims are available to 
private parties, local governments, and states to recover for a fuller range of harms associated with leakage from 
stored CO2.  Potential claims of trespass, negligence, nuisance, and strict liability, along with potential damages, 
offer the possibility for compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief not available under most federal 
and state environmental statutes [13]. The range of applicable common law doctrines are illustrated in Table 1. 
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3. Statutory Developments, Competition, and Limitations on Liability  
   
Even though EPA’s statutory authority does not allow it to address issues associated with long-term liability, 
property rights, 11 federal and state legislators are keenly aware of the importance of defining property rights and tort 
liability in advance of implementing CCS and long-term storage of CO2. Deployment of the first dozen or so CCS 
projects will provide a real-world experience for risk identification and management and to help establish 
appropriate mechanisms for assigning liability and funding to address potential harm.   
Arguments over whether existing federal legislation should preempt liability under state law are based on principles 
of constitutional law, federalism, statutory interpretation, and, in some cases, deference to agency positions arguing 
in favor of preemption [14].  In the case of CCS, however, Congress will likely consider and perhaps adopt broad 
federal legislation to govern many aspects of the CCS process in addition to whatever legislation is enacted at the 
state level.  If and when Congress considers such legislation, there undoubtedly will be arguments by industry, and 
perhaps federal agencies, that any such legislation should preempt state tort remedies in order to provide more 
settled-expectations to industry and avoid multiple liability standards. 
We caution against such an approach, as Congress has generally not acted to preempt state law in enacting 
environmental health and safety legislation, even when that legislation is intended to cover nationwide issues such 
as the regulation of air pollution, water, or waste [9].  Even though CCS is new and will require significant federal, 
state, and private resources to become viable, as the technology matures, it can look to existing and future liability 
and funding frameworks to create a reasonable certainty of investment without compromising public health, safety, 
and environmental protection. Such frameworks can be structured to enhance incentives for proper site selection and 
management for CCS projects.  Ensuring that existing liability frameworks are in place for CCS is particularly 
important at a time when federal agencies often do not have the resources to enforce their own regulations, creating 
an enforcement vacuum that had historically been filled by state tort law.   
4. Ensuring Financial Responsibility and Managing Liabilities for CCS   
Provisions for financial responsibility and liability during post-closure care and long-term stewardship of CCS 
projects must balance global and local risks with the climate benefit of CCS deployment.  If long-term stewardship 
and liability considerations are too onerous, firms may choose not to invest in CCS; if they are too lax, public and 
ecological health could be compromised and public confidence in CCS may suffer.  As the time-line for CCS 
projects (hundreds of years to thousands of years) is incongruous with the lifetime of private firms, legislators and 
regulators must develop institutional structures to manage CCS risks over the long term.  Such structures will likely 
be temporally segmented, with responsibility passing from private firms to public management for long-term 
stewardship.  While such risks are expected to be small, ensuring adequate funds are available during the post-
closure and long-term stewardship phases could follow several different formulae, but any approach must guarantee 
resources are available to cover public monitoring and potential remediation costs and avoid CCS projects becoming 
an unfunded public mandate [7, 15]. 
For CCS, augmenting statutory and common law liability within a tailored regulatory structure is a crucial 
component of risk management.  Shortcomings of relying solely upon general statutory and common law liability 
are:  (1) the ability to detect and assign blame for harm—especially in areas where many operators may be injecting 
into the same basin [16]; (2) the potential lack of necessary resources for firms injecting CO2 to address potential 
harms; and (3) the time horizon between cause (injection of CO2) and effect of any damages [17-19].  As a result of 
these shortcomings, we examine different approaches which can supplement liability frameworks and provide a 
compensation mechanism where liability is imposed [8]. The following table (Table 2) describes four financial 
mechanisms for compensation in cases of injury – bonding, insurance, a special fund, and a blended mechanism 
using private insurance and a pooled fund. 
11 See 73 Fed. Reg. 43492, 43495 (July 25, 2008) 
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Bonding Insurance Special Fund Blended Approach--Insurance and Pool
De
sc
ri
pt
io
n
Allows for the internalization of future 
damages by requiring an up-front 
commitment to offset costs of potential 
future pollution - often in the form of cash, 
a letter of credit, a surety bond, or a trust 
fund or escrow account. For bonds to be 
effective, the time frame they cover must 
be specified.
Serves to allocate risk through classifying the 
risk and pricing it, the use of policy exclusions 
and deductibles and the creation of 'surrogate 
regulation' where inspection, risk assessment 
and risk management act as de facto impetus 
towards better management.
A special fund for certain types of harm can 
allow prompt payment of claims but retain the 
ability of claimants to seek damages beyond 
the funding limits from responsible parties 
through the tort system.
Provides an alternative to the tort process by 
displacing (or preempting) tort law and setting 
caps on damages available from the fund. 
Proponants argue they help manage uncertain 
risks, protect industry from large jury awards and 
unnecessary lawsuits and provide a climate for 
private investment while still compensating injured 
parties.
M
ec
ha
ni
cs
The bond is posted up front, but if the firm 
does not comply, it is forfeited and 
remediation funds are immediately 
available.The burden of proof is shifted 
from the regulator to the operator and 
provides public protection up to the 
amount posted (but not necessarily the 
amount of damages).
Conventional rules of insurability include: 1) a 
sufficient number of similar and uncorrelated 
events to allow for risk pooling; 2) clearly 
calculable losses; 3) loss occuring within a 
well established time period; 4) frequent 
enough losses to calculate premiums and 5) 
insured party has no incentive to cause loss.
Operators pay into the fund based on an 
agreed metric, based on use or potential 
damage.
In addition to insurance requirements up to a level 
the private insurance industry is able to provide, a 
special industry fund is collected in case of a 
larger accident. These approaches are often 
coupled with a federal backstop and limit on 
liability. 
A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
fo
r 
C
C
S
For bonding to be effectively used for long-
term stewardship in a CCS project, 
several conditions would need to be met: 
1) the time frame covered by the bond 
must be clearly established; 2) the party 
responsible for the damages myst be 
identified; and 3) cost estimates - for 
monitoring, verifying and remediating 
damage - are needed to set the bond 
amount. 
CCS might violate many of the conventional 
rules of insurability. The lack of experience 
with large-scale CCS and inherent geologic 
heterogeneity creates problems for rules 1, 2 
and 4. The long time frames required for CCS 
may prove problematic for Rule 3.Insurers, 
however, believe they have the required 
experience to manage all environmental risks 
associated with CCS (with the possible 
exception of climate risk) primarily through a 
relatively recent insurance product, 
environmental impairment liability (EIL).
Operators could pay into a fund based initially 
on tons of CO2 injected and in later years pay 
at increased or decreased rates based on a 
risk-rated ton charge which incorporates site 
operational data and the risk of leakage after 
monitoring data has been gathered at the 
injection site and surrounding areas. The funds 
could be collected during active site injection, 
aligning income from injection with long-term 
care fund collection. 
Like the early nuclear industry, CCS highlights the 
importance of the interplay between encouraging 
technology deployment, protecting human health 
and the environment, and balancing the role of 
state and federal law. The blending of site specific 
insurance and pooled industry funds could provide 
both site-tailored risk management and ensure 
that adequate funds are available to cover 
damage in the post-closure period.
Ti
m
e F
ra
m
e
The role of bonding is inextricably linked 
to future regulation governing the 
operator's duration and scope of 
responsibility. If the post-closure period for 
site care is a fixed time period (as 
opposed to performance-based) bonding 
could be a useful tool. Bonding works well 
for short time frames, but over the 15 to 
50 years required for post-closure financial 
responsibility, bonding could tie up capital 
and prove less efficient than insurance-
based instruments.
EIL policies are claims-made and 'backward 
looking' in that they pay claims made on 
environmental damages that occurred in the 
past.
Allows for immediate relief for injured parties, 
but leaves room for assigning additional 
liability in court. A lowered liability cap within a 
strict liability federal fund for the first dozen or 
so full-sized CCS projects could help industry 
to gain confidence and experience. Care 
should be taken, however, to ensure such a 
cap does not become permanent as - in 
addition to removing normal incentives for 
responsible behavior - it could create a public 
backlash adversely affecting future CCS 
project siting.
Ex
am
pl
es
Bonding is currently used in the EPA's 
Underground Injection Control (UIC) 
program to ensure that wells are properly 
plugged and abandoned.  
Both RCRA and CERCLA use pollution 
liability insurance as a tool to control 
environmental pollution. EIL provides 
experience with all risks posed by a CCS 
project - with the exception of climate-related 
risks - and is tailored to site-specific risks, 
which is important for linking geologic 
variability within a risk management 
framework.
The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund 
(TAPL), creates a fund for quick payout of 
claims and allows claimants to seek damages 
in excess of the fund's maximum from liable 
parties under tort law. The Oil Pollution Act 
(OPA) reconciles existing regulatory standards 
and incorporates liability and risk management 
according to the location of the damage. OPA 
also includes a savings clause providing that 
nothing in it should be construed as 
preempting state or federal liability or 
obligations.
Congress has created specialized funds to 
displace the standard tort process for certain types 
of workplace injuries, the federal childhood 
vaccine program and nuclear power plants. For 
example, the Price-Anderson Fund requires each 
nuclear reactor over 10 MW to have $300M in 
insurance and any additional claims are paid from 
an industry-pooled fund, with each company 
contributing up to $98.5M if a nuclear accident 
occurs--currently about $10B. Any claims beyond 
this amount would be covered by funds raised by 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
Table 2.     Mechanisms to Finance Post Closure and Long-Term Stewardship for CCS
Table 2: Mechanisms to Manage Long-term Financial Responsibility 
5.  Managing Liability and Ensuring Long-Term Financial Responsibility  
The lifetime of private firms is much shorter than the period necessary to ensure public and environmental health 
protection in CCS projects, a transfer of responsibility from a single firm to a pooled fund held by a private or public 
entity must occur. Under the current regulatory authority—the Safe Drinking Water Act, the site operator is 
indefinitely responsible for the CCS site, but this arrangement may not be suitable to balance public stewardship and 
operator interests. One potential structure would be to adopt a post-closure care program of graduated responsibility 
which ensures that the CCS project operator is responsible for CCS care for a defined time period after closure.  
Over the first post-closure phase, the project operator would bear full responsibility for all liability and be required 
to provide some type of financial assurance.  Over the longer-term, stewardship of CCS projects—and funds to 
ensure remediation—would be transferred to a public or private organization with a pool of resources to ensure 
public and environmental health are managed over the long term.  Bonds, insurance, and selective damage caps (for 
early pilot projects and the long-term stewardship periods only) could all help ensure CCS risk is managed over the 
long-term.  We assume the CCS life-cycle will follow a pattern of active injection, site closure, post-closure, and 
long-term stewardship, with monitoring, remediation, and liability responsibility shifting from private to third-party 
(public or possibly a public-private hybrid) ownership with post-closure to long-term stewardship transition.  Here 
we posit that the regulatory framework must clarify how to transition ownership and responsibility from a private 
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operator CCS project to a public entity for long-term stewardship.  There could be a fixed time period of operator 
monitoring and responsibility (e.g., up to and including 15 or 30 years of post-closure care or even 50 years under 
the EPA Proposed Rules—though these rules require monitoring but do not have any provisions for a transfer of 
responsibility), at which time project responsibility would be passed to a public entity or a performance-based 
measure. The proposed EPA rules also explore a possibility that “post-injection site care will continue until the 
plume is stabilized and cannot endanger USDWs,” (p 43519). A similar provision could be adopted to initiate the 
transfer of CCS site responsibility.  
If any transition to public responsibility of CCS projects is to occur, it must be accompanied by sufficient funds to 
cover costs of long-term stewardship.  In addition to stimulating early CCS demonstration projects through the use 
of trust funds, a variety of funding models could ensure resources are available for post-closure and long-term 
stewardship phases of the CCS life-cycle [20].  We propose development of a three-tiered payment system that 
covers: (1) the active CO2 injection phase; (2) the post-closure period; and (3) long-term stewardship.  During Phase 
1 active CO2 injection, the CCS project operator holds insurance and site liability and pays a charge into a central 
fund, as pre-payment for long-term stewardship.  In Phase 2, the post-closure period, the operator is still responsible 
for site monitoring, verification, and necessary remediation, and is fully liable for damages.  During Phase 2, 
bonding or private insurance mechanisms could be used to cover monitoring and necessary remediation. These 
could be held at a project level—again to encourage responsible site operation by the owner/operator, or pooled 
across different projects if care were taken to manage any moral hazard. An industry-funded pool created, 
potentially at the basin or federal level, could ensure risk sharing and compensation for damages above individual 
operator liability caps.  To transition to Phase 3—public assumption of responsibility, the CCS site must meet pre-
determined performance based measures. During Phase 3, the long-term stewardship phase, necessary monitoring, 
remediation and damages would be funded from the federal pool, financed during the active injection phase. This 
Phase 3 fund could conceivably be administered by a public or semi-private entity and would be responsible for 
ensuring long-term data storage and site management for CCS injection sites.  The advantage of having this pool 
financed at the federal, as opposed to state or geologic basin level is two-fold.  First, risks of leakage or damage may 
be correlated with certain geologic formations, and this approach would spread the risk more widely.  Second, if this 
pool were linked to a site-specific damage cap, federal standards would provide a regulatory “floor” for 
environmental and technical standards.  
Separate from this phased liability and funding approach is the issue of how to encourage the development of the 
first CCS “pilot” projects.  For those projects, Congress could create a special federal fund with a damage cap that 
allows claimants to recover on a strict liability basis with the operator paying only the lowered damage cap and the 
federal government paying the rest.  By carefully structuring a path towards CCS commercialization—and ensuring 
that temporary systems to manage liability for pilot projects do not become permanent—Congress could help chart a 
path toward commercial CCS deployment. After the first dozen or so projects have been built, CCS project caps 
would be raised to the risk-based site specific caps described above, and operators would be regulated under a set of 
federal standards and subject to existing tort and environmental statutory liability (along with liability under any 
CCS-specific legislation), coupled potentially with other instruments like pooled federal funding, insurance, and 
bonding.  As a result, the federal government would take on a larger compensation burden in cases of harm in pilot 
projects throughout the CCS life-cycle, and for the long-term stewardship phase of all CCS projects.  This graduated 
and risk-based structure is designed to both encourage CCS development and ensure safe site-selection and project 
operation as well as compensate those who may be harmed by CO2 storage.  
6. Conclusions 
Existing statutory environmental laws and common law doctrines are crude tools for governing the complicated 
policy and regulatory issues associated with CCS and are no substitute for a comprehensive state and federal 
regulatory framework.  CCS-specific laws can consider the unique features of CCS, create regulatory safeguards to 
guide development, and create a permitting and compliance structure unique to CCS.  This does not mean, however, 
that the existing statutory and common law liability framework is not relevant.  RCRA and CERCLA are powerful 
environmental statutes that have been used to address a wide range of issues relating to waste and contamination 
since they were enacted over 20 years ago.  Common law, for its part, can evolve in a reasoned manner somewhat 
more insulated from interest groups than the political process; reach decisions based on sworn, scientific testimony 
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rather than the generalities often presented in legislative hearings; and can base decisions on individualized factual 
circumstances. 
The framework presented here could begin to address liability and funding issues associated with the long-term 
storage of CO2.  We propose a system that uses existing tort and statutory liability for harm associated with CCS as 
a backstop to comprehensive federal regulations and then places on top of it a funding system consisting of 
insurance, bonding, selected damage caps (for early pilot projects only) and pooled federal funding to provide 
protection both for CCS operators and for those potentially harmed by CCS.  Such a system can go a long way 
toward decreasing the risks of climate change while managing the local risks of CCS.  How liability is structured is 
important. While the first dozen or so CCS projects may require additional tools to manage uncertain liabilities in 
the earliest stages of development, we caution against blanket state absorption of liability and blanket pre-emption 
for commercial CCS projects.  Such proposals have the potential to eliminate important incentives for good site 
selection and responsible management, and do not address issues of compensation for potential damages from CCS 
projects.  Indeed, until a comprehensive federal framework is developed, existing environmental law and tort 
liability can help manage liability and encourage good site selection and project management.  
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